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Introduction 
In the post-Cold War era, defense budgets especially in developing 
countries have been affected by a number of trends in the world economy as 
well as changing perceptions of the economic impact of defense expenditures.  
In the early to mid-1990s perceived or actual reductions in international 
tensions associated with the end of the Cold War contributed to discussions 
regarding the magnitude of the “peace dividend” and its use.1  At the same 
time, the need for fiscal adjustment in many countries led to an increasing 
focus on “unproductive” spending in general including “excessive” military 
spending.2   
 
Despite the potentially positive economic role played by improved 
security bilateral and multilateral donors became increasingly concerned about 
military expenditures as growing amounts of aid flowed to countries involved 
in armed conflicts.  With the World Bank’s (and to a lesser extent the 
International Monetary Fund) increasing focus on poverty reduction and issues 
related to governance and public expenditure management, the donor 
community’s tolerance for military spending has been declining significantly.3  
 
Developments in the international economy reinforced the positions of 
the World Bank and IMF.  In particular neoliberalism became a driving force in 
globalization, and in the process redefined the role of national governments.    
Neoliberalism emphasizes a policy mix stressing a greater role for the market in 
the allocation of resources, a much-reduced role for the state, and increasing 
integration in the world economy.4 In the neoliberal world, defense 
expenditures are not considered productive in terms of enhancing economic 
performance.  Quite the contrary -- countries with high levels of defense 
                                                 
1 N. P. Gleditsch, et al., eds. The Peace Dividend (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1996). 
2 International Monetary Fund, “Reducing Unproductive Expenditures is Important for Fiscal 
Adjustment,” IMF Survey (February 24, 1997), pp. 49-51. 
3 “World Bank Ponders Military Spending,” Oxford Analytica (March 12, 2001). 
4 Robert Looney, “Neoliberalism,” in R.J. Barry Jones ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of 
International Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 1106-1110. 
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expenditures were considered at a distinct disadvantage in competing for 
foreign capital and in their ability to sustain high rates of economic growth. 
 
The post-September 11 period has seen a fundamental reassessment of 
the role of security expenditures, foreign aid, the neoliberal model and 
improved governance in effecting economic growth and stability.  Increasingly, 
the notion that a long-term commitment to economic growth and the 
alleviation of poverty is the best way at combating the pull of terrorism in 
developing countries.5  The challenge is in designing and maintaining 
governance structures and economic environments conducive to this type of 
anti-terrorism strategy while simultaneously providing for domestic security 
and remaining competitive in the international economy.   
 
Within this context, the sections below examine the causes and 
consequences of security expenditures. In particular:  how have defense 
budgets been affected by economic liberalization and improved governance? 
Have improvements in economic liberalization and progress in reforming broad 
areas of governance through bringing the forces of efficiency and 
accountability to bear on defense budgets resulted in declines in defense 
expenditures? Through facilitating improved levels of efficiency and economic 
growth, do these measures permit existing and expanded levels of defense 
expenditure to play a more productive role in supporting economic stability 
and development?  Or, as was the case for most of the Cold War period, have 
defense budgets been largely protected6 from these forces?  
 
Building on the results of this analysis, a final section examines the 
implication of the main findings for the broader discussion on security reform. 
Here it is suggested that rather than examining specific defense expenditures 
from the usual perspective of military effectiveness and defense efficiency a 
broader approach should be taken.  In particular, if part of a coordinated 
reform process, expanded defense expenditures should be able to undertaken 
without adverse impacts on economy.  Even higher levels of economic 
liberalization and defense expenditures may permit defense expenditures to 
meet their normal objectives while simultaneously providing a stimulus to 
economic growth.7  Since growth occurring in an environment of economic 
liberalization and improved governance is more likely to be broad based, rather 
than concentrated in certain areas, an efficient balance between military 
                                                 
5 Jennifer Bremer and John Kasarda, “The Origins of Terror: Implications for U.S. Foreign 
Policy,” Milken Institute Review (Fourth Quarter 2002), pp. 34-48. 
6 Norman Hicks and Ann Kubisch, “Cutting Government Expenditures in LDCs,” Finance & 
Development (September 1984), pp. 37-39. 
7 The mechanisms underlying this effect are assessed in Charles Wolf, “Economic success, 
Stability and the ‘Old’ International Order,” International Security (1981), pp. 75-92. 
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expenditures, economic liberalization and improved governance may be the key 
to long-term strategies8 to combat terrorism.  
Post-Cold War and the International Financial Institutions 
In recent years, the fungiblety9 of non-military loans and assistance into 
defense budgets, empirical evidence suggesting negative links between defense 
expenditure and economic growth,10 together with increased criticism of 
lending practices resulted in a shift in IMF and World Bank lending policy, 
especially after the Cold War. Starting in the early 1990s both organizations, 
began to view defense expenditures as a significant impediment to fiscal 
stability, growth and development. As the both organizations became 
concerned with defense expenditures they did so without directly raising any 
security issues. One reason for the approach taken by the IMF and World Bank 
is their mandates, which do not all them to interfere in political matters.  
Interpreting military expenditures as a purely fiscal matter however they could 
espouse views and discuss the matter with recipient country governments.11   
 
This focus on costs rather than benefits of military expenditures also 
stems from the fact that both organizations are dominated by neo-classical 
economists. In neo-classical economic theory, which emphasizes investment in 
productive capital as the engine of growth and economic development, military 
expenditure is considered to be pure waste.   With little explicit recognition or 
appreciation of the positive impacts that might be associated with defense an 
over-emphasis on zero-sum type diversion from other “productive” programs 
dominates the thinking at the Fund and Bank.  In fact, the IMF has an extensive 
list12 of publications concerning “unproductive” expenditures of which 
“excessive” defense is predominately mentioned.  
 
                                                 
8 Strategies built around this theme are developed in Robert Looney, “Failed Economic Take-
offs and Terrorism in Pakistan: Conceptualizing a Proper Role for U.S. Assistance,” Asian Survey 
XLIV:6 (November/December 2004), pp. 771-793. 
9 Examples are given in N. Khilji and E.M. Zampelli, “The Fungibility of US assistance to 
Developing Countries and the Impact on Recipient Expenditures: A Case Study of Pakistan,” 
World Development 19:8 (1991), pp. 1095-1105. 
10 Much of this work has been led by Saddat Deger and summarized in her Military 
Expenditures in her Military Expenditures in Third World Countries: the Economic Effects 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986).  A contrary view suggesting positive impacts 
derived from defense expenditures is presented in 10 See for example: P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. 
Looney, “Another Look at the Defense Spending and Development Hypothesis,” Defense 
Analysis (September 1985), pp. 205-210; R.E. Looney and P.C. Frederiksen, “Profiles of Latin 
American Military Producers,” International Organization (Summer 1986), pp. 745-752. 
11 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform (Geneva: 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 4, November 2003). 
12 See for example, Unproductive Public Expenditures: A Pragmatic Approach to Policy Analysis. 
Pamphlet Series No. 48 (Washington IMF , 1995). 
Draft – Comments, Suggestions Welcome 
4 of 32 
To its credit, the Fund’s approach to military expenditures has been 
reflective of its extensive internal research focused on trends defense 
expenditures and the manner these allocations have affected local economies.  
Typical of this research was a major study13 released in the late 1990s in which 
the Fund found that reducing military spending was critical for fiscal stability. 
 
Reinforcing this orientation, the post Cold War era has also seen 
substantial public pressure in many donor countries not to tolerate high 
military expenditures in countries which received cheap loans and grants. Why 
should taxpayers in countries providing development assistance be willing to 
indirectly subsidize military expenditure in recipient countries? 14 
Economic Liberalization  
In addition to the economic liberalization policies imposed by the World 
Bank and IMF as part of their lending conditions, the 1990s saw many 
countries voluntary adopting neoliberal policies based in part on the apparent 
success of what were thought15 were similar policies in the East Asian 
countries. In this context, neoliberalism has three chief components. First, it 
elevates the role of markets (over governments) in economic governance and in 
mediating flows of goods and capital (through the elimination of price 
supports and ceilings, free trade, market-determined exchange rates, etc.). 
Second, it enhances the role and scope of the private sector and private 
property (through privatization, deregulation etc.).  Finally, it promotes a 
particular notion of sound economic policy (through balanced budgets, labor-
market flexibility, low inflation, etc.). Advocates contend that these policies 
represent the only path to economic prosperity for countries in today’s 
globalized world economy.  Or, as Margaret Thatcher observed: “there is no 
alternative.”16 
 
Promoters of these reforms hoped the changes would make developing 
countries more attractive to foreign investment and would integrate those 
countries even further into a competitive, but peaceful, global economic 
network.  In its most extreme form, the vision became one in which these 
countries would become part of a liberal, open world economy that promoted 
Western values such as democracy.  
                                                 
13 Hamid Davoodi, Benedict Clements, Jerald Schiff and Peter Debaere, Military Spending, the Peace 
Dividend, and Fiscal Adjustment, IMF Working Paper WP/99/87 (Washington: International Monetary 
Fund, July 1999), p. 27. 
14 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform (Geneva: Centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Occasional Paper No. 4, November 2003). 
15 Analysis undertaken in the aftermath of the Asian crisis of 1997 suggested that the neoliberal model was 
not implemented in East Asia nearly to the extent commonly believed.  See W.  Braer et al., “The End of 
the Asian Myth: Why were the Experts Fooled?” World Development October 1999 
16 Quoted in Ronaldo Munck, “Neoliberalism, Necessitarianism and Alternatives in Latin America: There 
is No Alternative (TINA)?” Third World Quarterly 24:3 (June 2003), pp. 495-512. 
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Neoliberalism provided the economic foundation of the “new world 
order” advanced by the first President Bush.  That order was largely based on 
two assumptions: first, that a healthy economy and sound financial system 
make for political stability, and second that countries in business together do 
not fight each other. 17  
 
In the new world order, U.S. foreign policy’s number one priority was 
clear: to encourage the former Communist countries of Europe and the 
developing nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa to adopt business-friendly 
policies. Private capital would then flow from the developed world into these 
countries creating economic growth and jobs. When free enterprise took hold, 
so the argument went, traditional grievances, resentments, and hostilities 
would fade and with it the need to maintain large defense establishments and 
bloated military budgets.18 The hope was that neoliberalism would also 
promote democracy, good governance and sound economic policy in 
developing and transition countries.  
Measures of Economic Liberalization and Improved Governance 
To assess the relative strength of these diverse forces in the early 2000s, 
the following section examines the statistical linkages between defense 
expenditures and the various measures of economic liberalization and 
governance. The impact between allocations to defense and over-all economic 
growth is also examined to determine if the new institutional environment is 
compatible with increased allocations for security. 
Economic Freedom 
Economic liberalization manifests itself in a number of ways, with no 
one index or summary measure able to adequately capture al of its facets. 
Clearly, the term is closely associated with the concept of what is often referred 
to as “economic freedom.”  The Frasier Institute compiles various measures of 
economic freedom19  on the assumption that measures of personal choice, 
voluntary exchange, freedom to compete and protection of person and 
property adequately capture the main dimensions of what is commonly 
associated with “economic freedom.”   By this approach, institutions and 
policies are consistent with economic freedom when they provide an 
infrastructure for voluntary exchange and protect individuals and their property 
from aggressors seeking to use violence, coercion, and fraud to seize things 
that do not belong to them.  Legal and monetary arrangements are particularly 
important; governments promote economic freedom when they provide a legal 
                                                 
17 Nicols Checa, John Maguire, and Jonathan Barney, “The New World Disorder,” Harvard 
Business Review, August 2003. 
18 Checa, op. cit.. 
19 James Gwartney and Robert A. Lawson, Economic Freedom of the World (Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 
2003).  
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structure and law-enforcement system that protects the property rights of 
owners and enforces contracts in an even-handed manner.  They also enhance 
economic freedom when they facilitate access to sound money.  
 
The Frasier Institute makes its concept of economic freedom operational 
through developing its Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index.20 The EFW 
itself is a composite of the degree of economic freedom present in five major 
areas: 
 
x Size of government: Expenditures Taxes, and Enterprises 
x Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights 
x Access to Sound Money 
x Freedom to Exchange with Foreigners 
x Regulation of Credit, Labor and Business 
 
One advantage of assigning numbers to the various dimensions of 
economic freedom is that it facilitates comparisons across countries.  Countries 
receive a score ranging from 0 – no freedom to 10 – the highest level attainable 
on the total index and each of its five main components.  While this 
information is useful in and of itself, it also lends itself to the identification of 
empirical links with the real economy – does increased economic freedom 
facilitate higher rates of military expenditures? Higher rates of economic 
growth? Is economic freedom more significant in this regard than say the 
various dimensions of governance – political stability etc.  
 
Another index of economic freedom is compiled by the Heritage 
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.21 The focus of this index is on the 
relative progress made by countries in moving to a deregulated, limited 
government, free-market environment.  In short, the Heritage Index reflects the 
absence of government constraint or coercion on the production, distribution 
or consumption of goods and services. Stripped to its essentials, economic 
freedom is concerned with property rights and choice. To measure economic 
freedom the Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal Index takes ten different 
factors into account: 
  
1. Trade policy; 
2. Fiscal burden of government; 
3. Government intervention in the economy; 
4. Monetary policy; 
5. Banking and finance; 
                                                 
20 Economic Freedom of the World 2003, Global Economic Software, 
www.globlecomicsoftware.com 
21 See for example Marc Miles, Edwin Feulner and Mary Anastasia O’Grady and Ana Eiras, 2004 
Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2004). 
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6. Capital flows and foreign investment; 
7. Wages and prices; 
8. Property rights; 
9. Regulation, and 
10. Informal market 
 
Implied in these measures is the notion that economic freedom also 
requires governments to refrain from many activities. They must refrain from 
actions that interfere with personal choice, voluntary exchange, and the 
freedom to enter and compete in labor and product markets. Economic 
freedom is reduced when taxes, government expenditures, and regulations are 
substituted for personal choice, voluntary exchange and market coordination. 
Restrictions that limit entry into occupations and business activities also retard 
economic freedom. 
Governance 
 The other main area of US reform efforts, democracy and governance 
are increasingly seen as essential for long run economic growth and prosperity. 
In fact some dimensions of governance now sit at the center of academic and 
policy discussions of economic development.22 
 
  While the ranking of countries on the basis of their relative progress in 
attaining improved governance is inherently subjective, a recent World Bank 
study23 provides a set of rankings incorporating the full extent of our 
knowledge about this phenomenon. More precisely, the World Bank data set 
presents a set of estimates of six dimensions of governance covering 199 
countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2004. 
  
Voice and Accountability. This variable measures various aspects of the 
political process, civil liberties and political rights. These indicators measure the 
extent to which the citizens of a country are able to participate in the selection 
of governments. Also included in this variable are indicators measuring the 
independence of the media. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence. This governance cluster 
combines several indicators which measure perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown.. 
 
 Government Effectiveness. This variable combines aspects of the quality 
of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of 
                                                 
22 Herbert Kitschelt, “A Review of the Political Economy of Governance” World Bank Policy 
Research Working Paper 3315, May 2004, p.1 
23 Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance 
Indicators for 1996-2004 (Washington: World Bank,  2005). 
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civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and 
the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies.   
 
 Regulatory Quality.  This aspect of governance is more focused on the 
policies themselves.  It includes measures of the incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision as well as 
perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as 
foreign trade and business development. 
 
 Rule of Law. Included in this dimension of governance are several 
indicators which measure the extent to which the citizens of a country have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. These include perceptions of 
the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and 
the enforceability of contracts.  
 
 Control of Corruption This dimension of governance measures 
perceptions of corruption.  By this measure corruption is defined as the exercise 
of public power for private gain. It is often a manifestation of a lack of respect 
of both the corrupter and the corrupted for the rules which govern their 
interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance. 
Economic Liberalization, Governance and Defense Expenditures 
One of the main conclusions coming out of the empirical work on 
defense expenditures is that statistical studies of large samples of countries 
often reach inconclusive results because distinct sub-grouping of countries 
often have markedly different environments. As noted above many studies have 
found negative linkages between defense and growth.  On the other hand, 
several empirical studies24 have suggested that defense expenditures taking 
place in environments of plentiful savings or foreign exchange often produced 
positive impacts on growth. Similarly when these factors were relatively scarce 
defense expenditures often had a negative effect on economic growth.   
 
In today’s rapidly evolving and liberalizing world economy might not the 
relative progress made in economic liberalization and governance reforms act 
in a similar manner? Are countries achieving relatively high levels of economic 
liberalization and governance more likely to have removed institutional 
constraints on growth thus enabling the positive impacts of defense on the 
economy to predominate? These issues are examined below.  
                                                 
24 See for example: P.C. Frederiksen and R.E. Looney, “Another Look at the Defense Spending and 
Development Hypothesis,” Defense Analysis (September 1985), pp. 205-210; R.E. Looney and P.C. 
Frederiksen, “Profiles of Latin American Military Producers,” International Organization (Summer 1986), 
pp. 745-752. 
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Differences in High-Low Country Group Means 
In the early 2000s one apparent difference between countries is their 
defense burden (measured in terms of the share of the defense budget in Gross 
Domestic Product).  The mean of the average share of defense in GDP over the 
2000-200325 period is 2.66% with the countries below this level averaging 
1.49% while those above the mean average 5.49% Table 1.   
 
Other significant differences between the low defense countries and 
those with higher defense burdens include: 
 
1. Even greater differences in budgetary shares allocated to defense exist 
between the low defense and high defense countries with allocations to 
the military in low defense countries averaging 6.3% of the budget as 
opposed to 18.35% in the high defense countries. 
 
2. In the mid- to late-1990s both groups of countries had higher defense 
burdens and shares of the budget allocated to defense than in the early 
2000s. 
 
3. Interestingly despite the great differences in defense budgetary shares 
between the two groups, both groups allocated roughly the same shares 
of their budgets to education (6.0%) and health (4.5%).   
 
4. In the mid-to late 1990s, the high defense countries as a group actually 
had higher budgetary shares allocated to education and health.  
 
With regard to the key macroeconomic aggregates (Table 2) several 
significant differences exist between the high and low defense countries: 
 
1. The most striking difference occurs in the area of foreign direct 
investment (FDI as a share of GDP) with the low defense countries able 
to attract a significantly higher amount (18.29% as opposed to 5.43%).  
In the earlier period these differences were considerably less (5.43 vs. 
4.93). 
 
2. The low defense countries also exhibit slightly better macro performance 
in several key areas, government consumption where they have 
considerably lower shares (14.98% vs. 18.42%) and gross domestic 
savings where their share is somewhat above that (17.73% vs 14.98%) 
of the high defense countries. These differences between the two groups 
were similar to that found in the mid- to late 1990s. 
 
                                                 
25 Unless otherwise specified all data is from: World Development Indicators 2005 (Washington: World 
Bank, 2005). 
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3. Despite the higher rate of government consumption and lower savings 
rates, the investment rates of the high defense countries was only 
marginally lower (19.23 vs 20.91) and had actually been above (21.83% 
vs 20.70) the low defense countries in the mid- to late 1990s. 
 
4. In part, these investment rates translate into slightly superior growth 
rates for the non-defense countries in the early 2000s (2.32% vs 1.88%) 
and the high defense countries 2.99% vs 2.17%) in the mid- to late 
1990s. 
 
With regard to economic liberalization, the Fraser Institute’s measures 
suggest (Table 3) that the low defense countries have generally made better (in 
the Fraser Index larger numbers signify more freedom) progress. The one 
exception is access to sound money, where the high defense countries 
consistently score higher.  
 
 The Wall Street Journal/Heritage Foundation Economic Freedom Index 
presents a similar picture (Table 4).  In the 2000-2003 period, the high defense 
countries score higher (in this index low scores are indicative of greater 
economic freedom) in only the area of the fiscal burden. In the mid-late 1990s 
the high defense countries also had slightly better regulatory environments. 
  
The main area of deference between the high and low defense expenditure 
countries is their governance structures (Table 5) In all six areas of governance 
compiled by the World Bank, the low defense countries have made 
considerably more progress (reflected in higher scores) than their high defense 
counterparts.  The differences are especially great in the area of voice and 
accountability where the gap has widened somewhat over that in the mid-late 
1990s.  The smallest differences between the two groups are in the areas of 
rule of law and control of corruption.  
Economic Liberalization, Governance and  Military Expenditures 
A regression of the defense burden (average 2000-2003) on the 
measures of economic freedom and the various measures of governance 
(Frasier and Wall Street/Heritage) accounted for 43% of the variance in the 
defense burden across countries.  The statistically significant variables (in order 
of importance) were: voice and accountability (2000s), The Frasier summary 
measure of economic freedom (1990s), the Fraser legal structure index and 
finally the World Bank rule of law index (1990s). As the examination of the 
group means suggested, lower military expenditures coincide with improved 
governance and economic freedom. 
 
 Since the two defense-based groupings are quite distinct, a reform 
threshold may be present – those countries able to build on initial reform 
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efforts are able to sustain them over time whereas those that do not get off on 
a positive step with reforms are never able to build up sufficient broad-based 
support capable of effectively pressing for deeper liberalization.26 
Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth 
 As noted, one of the on-going debates in defense economics has been 
the role of military expenditures in effecting national economic growth. 
Traditionally models of the following type are used in a regression analysis to 
test the defense/growth link:   
 
GDPYPG   =         f(GFCY, AIDPER, GFDIY, GCNPY, MILXY) 
(Expected sign)          +         +         +          -           ?  
 
Where: 
x GDPYPG = Per-Capita GDP Growth (average 2000-2003)  
x GFCY = Gross Capital Formation Share GDP (average 2000-2003) 
x MILXY = Military Expenditure Share of GDP (average 2000-2003) 
x AIDPER = Aid Per Capita (average 2000-2003) 
x GFDIY = Gross Foreign Direct Investment Share of GDP (average 2000-
2003) 
x GCNY = Government Consumption share of GDP (average 2000-2003) 
 
 Aid and government consumption are usually added as control variables.  
Everything else equal, growth should be higher, the higher the rate of capital 
formation, foreign aid, and foreign direct investment.  Because government 
consumption may divert resources away from more productive uses, its sign is 
usually assumed to be negative.  Finally, the sign on the defense term MILXY is 
assumed indeterminate at this point, with many previous studies finding a 
positive sign, while others a negative sign, the results often depending on the 
countries chosen and the time period covered.   
 
 The main findings27 of this analysis (equation 1) suggest that for the 
sample as a whole military expenditures have a negative (albeit) weak impact 
on growth.  This negative impact strengthens (equation 2) if only the high 
defense countries are included in the analysis, while defense expenditures are  
not a statistically significant determination of growth in the low defense 





                                                 
26 Footnote on the vicious and virtuous circles of the Transition countries. 
27 Ordinary least squares regression. ** = statistically significant at the 95% level, ( ) = t statistic; R2(adj) = 
adjusted R2; F = F statistic; df = degrees of freedom. 
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Total Sample of Countries  
(statistically significant results, standardized coefficients)  
(1) GDPYPG = 0.357 GFCY – 0.202 MILXY 
                        (3.75)**          (-2.10)** 
                                    R2(adj) = 0.150; F = 9.282**; df = 94 
 
High Military Expenditure Countries 
(2) GDPYPG = -0.438 MILXY 
                         (-2.54)**  R2(adj) = 0.162; F = 6.424; df = 28 
 
Low Military Expenditure Countries 
(3) GDPYPG = 0.422 GFCY 
                        (3.72)**  R2(adj) = 0. 165; F = 13.83**; df = 65 
 
New Country Groupings – Relative Reform Environments 
 Taken literally, these initial regression results suggest that increased 
defense expenditures in the high defense group are detrimental to expanded 
growth. Two possible28 and somewhat related mechanisms may be at work: (1) 
the money allocated to defense would have had positive growth enhancing 
impacts if allocated to other areas,  (2) any positive externalities associated with 
defense are more than offset by the negative externalities related to this type of 
expenditure.   
 
 The fact that the high defense countries had fairly similar investment 
rates as the low defense countries may rule out the first explanation.  This 
interpretation is strengthened by the fact that both groups of countries also 
had fairly similar rates of expenditures on health and education. On the other 
hand there is some support for the externality explanation. Negative 
externalities may have prevailed in the high defense group, because the 
supporting environment did not exist for supporting positive linkages between 
military allocations and the over-all economy.   
 
 For many countries then, the real question is how to create 
environments whereby the positive economic effects of defense expenditures 
dominate the negative. This is a particularly relevant issue for the many 
countries having pressing needs for improved domestic security or increased 
protection from external threats. If the IMF and World Bank are correct in 
emphasizing economic liberalization and improved governance as keys to 
improved economic performance, then the answer may lie in achieving some 
sort of balance between defense expenditures and liberalization.   
                                                 
28 A third possible explanation is that certain key variables impacting defense expenditure were omitted 
from the regression equation.  This is a problem for all regression analysis. In any case inclusion of 
additional variables even if significant is highly unlikely to change the sign on the defense term.  
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 The regression equation for military expenditures noted above can 
provide an initial start in identifying different reform environments associated 
with defense expenditures.  The regression equation itself defines an average 
rate of economic liberalization/governance to defense expenditures.  
Conceptually, if liberalization/governance is on the horizontal axis, those 
countries above the regression line have high defense expenditures relative to 
their progress in economic liberalization/governance.  Correspondingly those 
countries below the regression line have made above average progress in 
reforms given their allocations to defense. 
Differences in High-Low Defense Relative to Reforms Country Groupings 
 The new groupings of high and low defense countries relative to their 
economic liberalization and improved governance display some interesting 
characteristics: 
 
1. In contrast to the simple high/low defense groupings (Table 1) the new 
groupings (Table 6) are closer together in terms of their allocations to 
defense (Figures 1 and 2).  In the original grouping the difference in 
means (for the period 2000-2003) between the high and low defense 
countries was fairly high (5.49% of GDP vs 1.49%).  The corresponding 
figures for the new groupings is (3.19% vs 1.67%).   
 
Figure 1 Country Group Comparisons: Military Expenditures 
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Figure 2 Relative Reform Group Comparisons: Military Expenditures 

























Relatively Low Defense Countries
Relatively High Defense Countries
 
 
2. With regards to education expenditures, the new high defense group 
spends more on education (6.25% GDP vs 6.12% GDP than its low 
defense counterparts, while the low defense group allocates a larger 
percentage to health.  
 
3. In sharp contrast to the situation in the first grouping the high defense 
group now grew faster (1.94% vs 1.76% per capita) than the low 
defense group in the early 2000s (Table 7).  In recent years the growth 
paths of the high and low defense countries (by both measures) appear 
to be converging (Figures 3 and 4). 
 
4. Since the mid-1990s the patterns of net foreign direct investment have 
diverged somewhat for the two groups of countries (by both 
definitions). Generally the low defenses countries have been more 
successful in attracting foreign investment (Figures 5, 6).  At this point it 
is not clear whether this is because of their generally higher level of 
economic liberalization and governance or the fact that they are likely to 
be “safer” places for foreign investment.  These patterns raise questions 
concerning the ability of high defense countries to maintain their 
relatively good growth rates. 
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Figure 3 Country Group Comparisons: GDP Growth Per Capita 
 

































Figure 4 Relative Reform Group Comparisons: GDP Growth Per Capita 
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Figure 5 Country Group Comparisons: Net Foreign Direct Investment 



































Figure 6 Relative Reform Group Comparisons: Net Foreign Direct Investment 
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5. In part the growing gap between the high and low defense countries 
has been offset somewhat by higher aid flows to the high defense 
countries (Figures 7, 8). However in the period prior to September 11, 
2001 these flows had experienced a long-run secular trend downward. It 
is unclear at this point if the post September 11 increases in resources 
from this source will be sustained.    
 
6. Another concern for the high defense countries is the long-run secular 
decline (relative to that experienced in the low defense countries) in 
investment rates (Figures 9, 10). While investment rates have picked up 
slightly in recent years enabling these countries to converge with the low 
defense countries rates in the low defense countries, it is unclear 
whether rates will revert to their long-run pattern, placing more pressure 
on economic liberalization and governance reforms as sources of 
growth. 
 
7. There is much more parity in economic liberalization between the two 
newly constructed groups.  In terms of the Fraser indexes the high 
defense group now leads in several areas (Table 8): size of government 
and exchange with foreigners while pulling even in the access to sound 
money dimension. In contrast with the previous groupings the high 
countries had better progress in only one area of the Wall Street 
Journal/Heritage economic freedom index (Table 4) they now lead the 
low defense countries in 6 of the 10 major index subdivisions (Table 9). 
 
8. Finally in the important area of governance the newly defined high 
defense countries lead their low defense counterparts (Table 10) in (1) 
voice and accountability, (2) political stability, and (3) regulatory quality.  
In the previous grouping (Table 5) the low defense group had attained 
higher levels in all six areas of governance. 
 
 Applying the previous growth regression model to the new country 
groupings produced sharply different results.  For the high military expenditure 
group (equation 4), defense expenditures did not adversely affect growth – the 
defense term was not statistically significant in the estimated equation. 
 
 In contrast those countries with relatively low levels of defense given 
their progress in economic liberalization and governance (equation 5) 
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Figure 7 Country Group Comparisons: Aid Per Capita 





























Figure 8 Relative Reform Group Comparisons: Aid Per Capita 
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Figure 9 Country Group Comparisons: Gross Capital Formation 
 



































Figure 10 Relative Reform Group Comparisons: Gross Capital Formation 
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High Military Expenditure Countries 
 (statistically significant results, standardized coefficients)  
(4) GDPYPG = 0.567 GFCY 
                       (3.95)**      
                         R2(adj) = 0.301; F = 15.621**; df = 34 
 
Low Military Expenditure Countries 
 (5) GDPYPG = 0.565 GFCY + 0.285 MILXY 
                         (4.21)**          (2.12)** 
     R2(adj) = 0.353; F = 10.80; df = 36 
 
The results are also stable across groups above (over-achievers—actual 
rates of growth greater than predicted) and below (under-achievers—actual 
rages of growth lower than predicted) the regression equations.  Note the 
increase in the coefficient of determination (r2) signifying improved model 
specification with more homogenous sub-groupings of countries. 
 
Over-Achieving Countries With Relatively High Military Expenditures 
(6) GDPYPG = 0.532 GFCY + 0.406 AIDPER 
                   (2.86)**           (2.19)**  
    R2(adj) = 0.624; F = 13.47; df = 15 
Under-Achieving Countries With Relatively High Military Expenditures 
(7) GDPYPG = 0.873 GFCY 
                  (7.40)** 
    R2(adj) = 0.749; F = 54.69; df = 18 
 
 
Over-Achieving Countries With Relatively Low Military Expenditures 
(8) GDPYPG = 0.565 GFCY + 0.510 MILXY 
                        (3.37)**          (3.04)** 
    R2(adj) = 0.495; F = 9.839; df = 18 
 
 
Under-Achieving Countries With Relatively Low Military Expenditures 
(9) GDPYPG = 0.659 GFCY + 0.405 MILXY 
                        (4.05)**             (2.49)** 
    R2(adj) = 0.549; F = 11.37; df = 17 
 
Implications 
Previously, much of the conventional wisdom of defense economics has 
left those countries facing declining economic growth combined with rising 
security problems with few attractive alternatives.  Cutting defense 
expenditures to stimulate the economy, may create a vicious cycle whereby 
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increased security concerns begin negatively impacting on the economy, 
requiring further military cut-backs and so on.   Increasing defense 
expenditures were felt to harm the economy, perhaps in turn resulting in 
increased domestic discontent over time. The results presented here suggest 
that choices facing decision makers may not be this stark and that countries 
may have a wider variety of policy options than previously thought. 
 
A recent IMF study29 on armed conflict and terrorism in low and middle 
income countries concluded that conflict is associated with lower growth and 
higher inflation.  The study also found that conflict and terrorism also leads to 
higher government spending on defense. From this they conclude that there is 
a potential for a sizeable “peace dividend for countries that are able to resolve 
conflict and terrorism.  Our results don’t dispute this. On the other hand, they 
are consistent with the position that increased defense expenditures under 
certain conditions may be an effective means of staving off conflict and 
terrorism in the first place.  
 
While the empirical work is still at the exploratory stage, the main fining 
of this study is that it is likely there are key combinations of reforms and 
governance measures capable of neutralizing many of the adverse economic 
effects often found associated with defense expenditures.  Specifically countries 
with low levels of defense expenditures relative to their overall progress in 
economic liberalization and governance appear to have a good chance of 
creating environments capable of actually obtaining a positive economic 
stimulus from allocations to defense.  With the right economic and governance 
reforms this might create a virtuous circle of improved security leading to 
further growth and pressure for additional economic and governance reforms 
to sustain the expansion – an environment likely to lessen the attractiveness of 
domestic terrorism. 
 
 For countries with high levels of defense relative to their progress in 
reforms, gains in some areas of economic freedom and governance appear 
sufficient to neutralize many of the negative impacts often found associated 
with defense expenditures.  While it is unlikely these countries will be able to 
obtain net positive effects from defense expenditures, they are not necessarily 
condemned to defense budgetary cuts as their sole means of obtaining some 
sort of peace dividend.  Selective economic liberalization, and improved 
governance in key areas may be sufficient for this purpose. For these countries 
security sector reform is best thought of in a broad context with coordinated 
reforms in the economic and governance areas just as important as 
                                                 
29 Sanjeef Gupta, Benedict Clements, Rina Bhattacharya, and Shamit Chakravarti, Fiscal Consequences 
ofArmed Conflict and Terrorism in Low- and Middle-Income Countries,” (Washington: International 
Monetary Fund, August 2002). 
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developments in the defense area in attaining security objectives, particularly 
those of combating the pull of terrorism.  
 
In the European context the term “security sector reform” has its roots in 
the development donor debate on how best to target and implement 
development assistance.30 In this sense the implications for donors and the 
international financial organizations are clear.  Rather than worrying about and 
trying to define what levels of defense expenditures are “excessive” or looking 
at defense expenditures as “unproductive” aid donors, the IMF, and World 
Bank should let countries determine their own security needs.  At that point, 
the role of the international organizations would be to play a constructive role 
in suggesting and supporting reforms to integrate defense expenditures into an 
overall pro-growth, economic liberalization/governance reform agenda.  
 
Finally, a major element of democratic civil-military relations, defense 
efficiency seeks to understand whether military and security establishments can 
accomplish roles and missions at the least possible cost to society. Economic 
liberalization always entails a number of paradoxes: free trade from a 
mercantilist perspective is thought to weaken national economic strength when 
in actuality it enhances national economic power.  To those primarily 
concerned with security issues, the wave of economic liberalization and 
neoliberal policies in the 1990s under the Washington Consensus appeared to 
give appeared to give the international financial agencies, as well as domestic 
reformers a rationale for cutting allocations to the military, and, as noted 
above, cuts have been associated with increased economic liberalization.  
However these same reforms may create an environment minimizing many of 
the disruptive economic effects often responsible for dampening necessary 
build-ups in security budgets. The key is to coordinate economic liberalization 
and governance reforms in the civilian sector with the requirements for 













                                                 
30 Michael Brzoska, Development Donors and the Concept of Security Sector Reform, Occasional Paper 
No. 4 (Geneva: Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003), p. 3. 
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Table: 1  
 
Comparison: High/Low Defense Expenditure Countries  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Military/Social                           Defense         Defense         Military          Health        Education 
                                              Budgetary    Expenditure    Personnel      Expenditure   Expenditure 
                                                  Share           % GDP    % Labor Force      % GDP              %GDP                      
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  6.30 1.49 0.99 6.03 4.50 
 
   Germany  4.57 1.48 0.69 10.77 4.55 
 India  14.38 2.30 0.51 6.17 4.11 
 Indonesia                        -- 1.14 0.48 3.00 1.41 
 Romania  8.21 2.41 1.93 6.07 3.29 
 Uganda  12.85 2.35 0.48 7.07 -- 
 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  18.35 5.49 3.08 6.00 4.40 
 
 Chile  18.91 3.71 1.83 5.73 4.07 
 Colombia  17.69 3.85 1.41 8.13 4.64 
 Russia  18.41 4.05 1.78 5.97 3.02 




Group Differences 1995-1999 
 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean  7.24 1.57 1.13 5.85 4.16 
 
 Germany  4.81 1.58 0.86 10.60 4.60 
 India  15.11 2.23 0.53 5.45 3.61 
 Indonesia  9.66 9.66 0.52 2.55 1.24 
 Romania  9.08 2.80 2.81 8.50 5.59 
 Uganda  17.42 2.33 0.42 5.80 2.48 
 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  20.82 5.78 3.44 6.06 4.38 
 
 Chile  -- 3.58 2.08 6.05 3.78 
 Colombia  -- 3.08 1.36 9.80 4.18 
 Russia  -- 3.82 2.14 5.65 3.67 
 United States -- 3.26 1.12 13.00 5.39 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Compiled from World Development Indicators 2005 (Washington: World Bank, 2005).  
 
 
Draft – Comments, Suggestions Welcome 
24 of 32 
 
Table: 2  
 




Macroeconomic                   Government    Private       Gross Domestic Gross Capital     Foreign   
Measures                            Consumption  Consumpt       Savings         Formation     Direct Invest 
                                                % GDP        % GDP              %GDP            %GDP             %GDP 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean 14.98 67.31 17.73 20.91 18.29 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 18.42 67.35 14.98 19.23 4.65 
 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean 14.74 68.54 16.66 20.70 5.43 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 18.41 68.11 13.24 21.83 4.93 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Macroeconomic                          GDP        Gross Capital  Government     Exports      Per Capita  
Measures                                Per Capita     Formation    Consumption   % Growth     Income 
                                               % Growth     % Growth     % Growth                              $PPP 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences Values 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean 2.32 5.33 5.45 7.62 9540.41 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 1.88 1.89 4.32 8.30 7150.72 
 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean 2.17 6.35 2.43 6.50 8566.55 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 2.99 12.50 5.13 7.04 7046.63 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 














Draft – Comments, Suggestions Welcome 
25 of 32 
Table: 3 Relative Reform/Governance Progress: High/Low Defense Expenditure Countries --  
Share of Defense Expenditures in GDP 
______________________________________________________________________________________
Fraser                            Size of            Legal            Access          Exchange      Regulation  
Economic                  Government     Structure      to Sound            With                         
Freedom Index                                                         Money         Foreigners                                                                  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2002 
Low Defense Countries 
     Mean  4.31 4.25 5.92 5.23 4.35 
High Defense Countries 
     Mean  4.25 4.06 5.58 4.94 4.25 
 
Group Differences 1990-1995 
Low Defense Countries  
     Mean  5.21 5.86 6.20 6.41 5.25 
High Defense Countries 
     Mean  5.19 4.88 6.33 5.99 5.15 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Fraser Economic                               Summary     Summary        Average         Average  
Freedom Index                                    2000s          1990s         Rank 2000s    Rank 1990s                                             
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences  
Low Defense Countries 
     Mean   4.81 5.77 44.51 59.04 
High Defense Countries 
     Mean   4.62 5.48 51.09 68.50 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________- 
Data derived from: Economic Freedom of the World 2003 (Vancouver: Fraser 























Draft – Comments, Suggestions Welcome 
26 of 32 
 
Table: 4 Relative Economic Reform: High/Low Defense Expenditure Countries—Share of 
Defense Expenditures in GDP (contd) 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Heritage Foundation                           Trade          Fiscal     Government   Monetary     Foreign 
Economic Freedom Index                    Policy         Burden    Intervention     Policy       Investment 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean   3.73 3.73 3.58 3.41 3.04 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean   3.47 3.91 3.15 3.34 2.69 
 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean   3.43 3.38 3.46 2.46 3.11 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean   3.32 3.66 2.88 2.43 2.78 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Heritage Foundation                        Banking &    Wages &    Property    Regulation    Informal  
Economic Freedom Index                   Finance        Prices         Rights                            Market 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean   3.22 2.97 2.88 3.26 3.56 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean   2.95 2.85 2.72 3.35 3.39 
 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean   3.22 2.92 3.27 3.55 3.55 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean   2.86 2.68 2.96 3.44 3.41 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Low values indicate greater progress in economic reforms 
Compiled from: Index of Economic Freedom Rankings, (Washington: Heritage Foundation), 
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Table: 5 Relative Reform/Governance Progress: High/Low Defense Expenditure Countries --  




World Bank                                Voice        Political  Government   Regulatory     Rule      Control  
Governance                        Accountability  Stability   Effectiveness  Quality        of Law    Corrupt 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2004 
Low Defense Countries 
     Mean  0.1177 0.0397 0.0827 0.1338 0.0157 0.0476 
High Defense Countries  
     Mean  -0.5597 -0.4554 -0.1473 -0.2244 -0.1616 -0.0972 
 
Group Differences 
Low Defense Countries  
     Mean  0.1041 0.1429 0.1514 0.1812 0.0764 0.0750 
High Defense Countries 
     Mean  -0.4997 -0.4287 -0.1404 -0.2074 -0.0465 -0.1136 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Notes:  Higher numbers = greater economic freedom/Governance. Governance Data Compiled 
from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: 
Governance Indicators for 1996-2004, (Washington: World Bank, June 2005). Economic 
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Table: 6  
 
Comparison: High/Low (Relative to State of Governance/Economic Reforms) Defense 
Expenditure  Countries  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Military/Social                           Defense         Defense         Military            Health        Education 
                                              Budgetary    Expenditure    Personnel      Expenditure   Expenditure 
                                                  Share           % GDP    % Labor Force      % GDP              %GDP                      
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  7.40 1.67 1.10 6.12 4.63 
 
 Germany 5.58 1.48 0.69 10.77 4.55 
 India  14.38 2.30 0.52 6.17 4.12 
 Uganda 12.85 2.35 0.48 7.07 -- 
 
High Defense Countries  
 Mean  11.53 3.19 2.01 6.25 4.33 
 
 Chile  18.91 3.71 1.83 5.73 4.07 
 Colombia 17.69 3.85 1.41 8.13 4.64 
 Indonesia -- 1.14 0.48 3.00 1.41 
 Romania 8.21 2.41 1.93 6.07 3.29 
 Russia  18.41 4.05 1.78 5.97 3.02 




Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  9.24 1.80 1.24 5.98 4.27 
 
 Germany 4.81 1.58 0.86 10.60 4.60 
 India  15.10 2.23 0.53 5.45 3.61 
 Uganda 17.42 2.33 0.42 5.80 2.48 
 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  12.58 3.18 2.33 6.05 4.18 
 
 Chile  -- 3.58 2.08 6.05 3.78 
 Colombia -- 3.08 1.36 5.80 4.18 
 Indonesia 9.66 1.23 0.52 2.55 1.24 
 Romania 9.08 2.80 2.81 5.50 3.52 
 Russia  -- 3.82 2.14 5.65 3.67 
 United States  3.26 1.12 13.00 5.39 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table: 7  
 
Comparison: High/Low (Relative to State of Governance/Economic Reforms) Defense 
Expenditure  Countries  
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Macroeconomic                   Government    Private       Gross Domestic Gross Capital     Foreign   
Measures                            Consumption  Consumpt       Savings         Formation     Direct Invest 
                                                % GDP        % GDP              %GDP            %GDP             %GDP 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  15.12 64.60 20.14 20.49 25.82 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  16.58 65.33 18.24 19.74 5.68 
 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean  14.62 66.16 19.10 20.22 5.12 
High Defense Countries 







Macroeconomic                          GDP        Gross Capital  Government     Exports      Per Capita  
Measures                                Per Capita     Formation    Consumption   % Growth     Income 
                                               % Growth     % Growth     % Growth                              $PPP 
 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences Values 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean 1.76 3.90 5.37 6.40 11326.83 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 1.94 3.64 3.43 7.26 9540.10 
 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean 1.96 5.56 3.03 7.43  10379.30 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean 1.39 9.06 3.01 6.45 8741.01 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table: 8  
Comparison: High/Low (Relative to State of Governance/Economic Reforms) Defense 
Expenditure  Countries (contd) 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Fraser                            Size of            Legal           Access          Exchange       Regulation  
Economic Freedom   Government    Structure      to Sound           With                         
Index                                                                       Money         Foreigners                                                                  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean 4.25 4.27 5.84 5.10 4.36 
High Defense Countries  
 Mean 4.36 4.12 5.84 5.24 4.28 
 
Group Differences 1990-1995 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean 5.20 5.67 6.24 6.18 5.36 
    High Defense Countries 
 Mean 5.22 5.54 6.23 6.49 5.07 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Fraser Economic                                Summary     Summary          Average         Average  
Freedom Index                                    2000s          1990s           Rank 2000s    Rank 1990s 
                                                                                                             
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  4.82 5.78 44.52 59.05 
Group Differences 1990-1995  
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  4.62 5.49 51.09 68.50 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Data derived from: Economic Freedom of the World 2003 (Vancouver: Fraser 
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Table: 9  
Comparison: High/Low (Relative to State of Governance/Economic Reforms) Defense 




Heritage Foundation         Trade          Fiscal     Government   Monetary     Foreign 
Economic Freedom Index  Policy         Burden    Intervention     Policy       Investment 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  3.42 3.72 2.91 2.19 2.78 
High Defense Countries  
 Mean  3.03 3.50 2.95 2.37 2.64 
 
Group Differences 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  3.51 3.89 3.14 3.04 2.69 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  3.19 3.78 3.03 3.42 2.48 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Heritage Foundation      Banking &    Wages &    Property    Regulation    Informal  
Economic Freedom         Finance        Prices         Rights                            Market 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Average Values 2000-2003 
Low Defense Countries 
 Mean  2.87 2.62 2.79 3.33 3.11 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  2.79 2.58 2.90 3.26 3.37 
 
Average Values 1995-1999 
Low Defense Countries  
 Mean  2.76 2.62 2.47 3.24 2.96 
High Defense Countries 
 Mean  2.92 2.78 2.67 3.076 3.49 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Compiled from: Index of Economic Freedom Rankings, (Washington: Heritage 
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Table: 10  
Comparison: High/Low (Relative to State of Governance/Economic Reforms) Defense 





World Bank                               Voice        Political  Government   Regulatory     Rule      Control  
Governance Index              Accountability  Stability   Effectiveness  Quality        of Law    Corrupt 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
Group Differences 2000-2004 
Low Defense Countries 
         Mean    0.0940 -0.0238 0.2495 0.2175 0.1946 0.2355 
High Defense Countries 
       Mean     0.1863 0.0654 0.1785 0.2853 0.1195 0.1352 
 
Group Differences 1996-1998 
Low Defense Countries 
      Mean    0.1177 0.0616 0.3231 0.3357 0.3275 0.2779 
High Defense Countries 
      Mean    0.1581 0.1356 0.2034 0.3259 0.1372 0.1038 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
Governance Data Compiled from: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo 
Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004, 
(Washington: World Bank, June 2005), and Economic Freedom of the World, 
www.globaleconomicsoftware.com,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
